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Abstract
This article investigates the stringency of EU climate and energy governance along the soft-hard continuum as a key deter-
minant of its ability to achieve its ambitions. It introduces four criteria for a systematic and differentiated assessment of
the bindingness/stringency of legislative instruments and governance frameworks, namely: (1) formal legal status, (2) the
nature of the obligations (substantive—procedural), (3) their precision and prescriptiveness, and (4) the means for effect-
ing accountability and effective implementation. The application of this assessment framework to the EU’s Climate and
Energy Policy Framework for 2030 in comparison with the preceding 2020 Framework and the international Paris Agree-
ment on climate change demonstrates the added value of this approach. The focus is on regulations, adopted in 2018,
regarding greenhouse gas emissions, renewable energy (RE), and energy efficiency as well as the surrounding framework
for planning, reporting, monitoring, and enforcement. The EU’s 2030 Framework scores high on the four criteria. Despite
implementing the comparatively soft Paris Agreement, it does not fall behind the stringency of the 2020 Framework, as the
abandoning of binding national targets for RE is balanced by strengthened obligations to prepare national plans, long-term
strategies, and regular progress reports, as well as the enhancedmonitoring and supervisory powers of the European Com-
mission. While actual delivery will not least depend on how the Commission will use its established and newly acquired
powers and tools, the 2030 Framework reinforces EU interest in strengthening international climate governance under the
Paris Agreement.
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1. Introduction
This article focuses on a key aspect of the effectiveness
of EU (and indeed international) climate policy, namely
the certainty that it will be able to achieve its ambitions.
It is well established that the national climate action
plans under the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change
(dubbed “Nationally Determined Contributions”—NDCs)
and the objective of EU climate policy to reduce green-
house gas (GHG) emissions by at least 40 per cent com-
pared to 1990 levels by 2030 are insufficient. These plans
and objective fail to put the world on a path towards
averting dangerous anthropogenic climate change and
limiting the increase of global average temperature to
well below 2 or even 1.5°C as envisaged by Article 2 of
the Paris Agreement (e.g., United Nations Environment
Programme [UNEP], 2018).Much less attention has been
paid to exploring how certain we can be that the estab-
lished ambition will actually be delivered, with recent
analyses reinforcing doubts in this respect (European
Environment Agency [EEA], 2018; UNEP, 2018). This ar-
ticle aims to shed light on this issue by focusing on the
features of policy frameworks which help ensure that es-
tablished plans and targets will actually be implemented
and achieved. Foundational for this thinking is the con-
ceptualisation of the bindingness and stringency of par-
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ticular policies and policy frameworks along a soft-hard
continuum, as further developed in Section 3.
Empirically, the article focuses on the EU’s Climate
and Energy Policy Framework consisting of a number of
legislative instruments. In 2017/18 this Framework was
updated and extended from the existing time-horizon of
2020 to 2030 in response to the international Paris Agree-
ment, as discussed in Section 2. In order to assess how
certain we can be that the ambitions of the 2030 Frame-
work will be delivered, the stringency of governance em-
bodied in this Framework is to be analysed. In approach-
ing this question, identifying changes from the existing
2020 Framework seems useful, as it allows us to assess
whether delivery has become more or less certain. In
addition, the stringency of international climate gover-
nance under the Paris Agreement constitutes a valuable
point of reference, as it puts EU climate and energy gov-
ernance in a broader context.
The investigation thereby also aims to enhance clar-
ity of existing debates on the stringency of EU climate
and energy governance that have led to apparently con-
tradictory findings. On the one side, research has in part
held that EU energy governance has traditionally tended
to be soft and that the 2030 Framework could harden
this softness to some extent (Ringel & Knodt, 2018; see
also Szulecki, Fischer, Gullberg, & Sartor, 2016). On the
other side, the decision to abandon binding national tar-
gets for renewable energy (RE) in the 2030 Framework
and to devise a new framework for EU climate and energy
governance have fed concerns about a possible weaken-
ing of this governance (e.g., ClientEarth, 2016; Meyer-
Ohlendorf, 2015; Meyer-Ohlendorf, Duwe, Umpfenbach,
& McFarland, 2014). Such concerns have been further
nourished by the softening of international climate gov-
ernance under the 2015 Paris Agreementwhich the 2030
Framework implements. By establishing clear and firm
criteria for the bindingness/stringency of governance,
this article attempts to provide a firm basis for clarify-
ing and addressing these apparently contradictory find-
ings. It thereby also holds potential for further research
on European governance touching on aspects of soft and
hard governance, such as research on the Open Method
of Coordination (OMC) and “experimental governance”
(de la Porte & Pochet, 2012; Sabel & Zeitlin, 2008, 2010;
Trubek & Trubek, 2005).
Against this backdrop, the article proceeds in three
steps. First, Section 2 introduces the EU Climate and
Energy Policy Framework as it evolved from2020 to 2030,
as well as the related international Paris Agreement on
climate change concluded in 2015. This is followed by the
introduction of four key criteria for the bindingness of
governance along the soft-hard continuum in Section 3
(formal status, nature of the obligations, prescriptive-
ness and precision, means for effecting accountability
and effective implementation). Subsequently, Section 4
employs these key criteria to assess the bindingness of
the 2030 Framework in comparison with the preceding
2020 Framework, and to contrast it to global climate gov-
ernance under the Paris Agreement. The concluding part
synthesises and discusses the results, including with re-
spect to the aforementioned discussions.
Overall, I argue that the 2030 Framework features
a relatively high level of bindingness and does not re-
duce the stringency of EU climate and energy gover-
nance compared to the 2020 Framework. However, it
does modify the balance of the four dimensions of bind-
ingness. Whereas binding national targets for RE are dis-
continued (nature of the obligations), obligations to pre-
pare national plans, long-term strategies, and regular
progress reports, as well as the monitoring and super-
visory powers of the European Commission are signif-
icantly strengthened. While the 2030 Framework rein-
forces EU interest in strengthening international climate
governance under the Paris Agreement, actual delivery
will not least depend on how the Commission uses its es-
tablished and newly acquired powers and tools.
2. The EU’s 2030 Climate and Energy Policy Framework
and the Paris Agreement
2.1. 2030 Framework
The EU’s 2030 Climate and Energy Policy Framework
builds on the preceding 2020 Framework. The 2020
Framework contains and implements three headline tar-
gets of 20 per cent for 2020: a 20 per cent GHG emission
reduction, a 20 per cent share of RE in final energy con-
sumption, and a 20 per cent improvement in energy ef-
ficiency (EE). While the first two targets are binding on
member states (entailing specific differentiated national
sub-targets), the EE target is indicative only. The 2020
Framework has been implemented through four key leg-
islative instruments: three Directives (on the EU emis-
sions trading system, RE and EE) and an “effort-sharing”
decision on reduction targets for member states’ GHG
emissions outside the emissions trading system (Delbeke
& Vis, 2015; Jordan, Huitema, van Asselt, Rayner, &
Berkhout, 2010; Oberthür & Pallemaerts, 2010). The
2018 analysis of the EEA suggests that the EU remains on
track to overachieving its binding GHG emission reduc-
tion target for 2020 and has its binding RE target within
reach, but may find it difficult to achieve its indicative EE
target (EEA, 2018).
The 2030 Framework updates and further develops
the 2020 Framework. After the European Council de-
fined the cornerstones of the 2030 Framework in Octo-
ber 2014 (European Council, 2014), the European Com-
mission issued proposals for implementing legislative in-
struments in 2015 and 2016. The European Parliament
and the Council of Ministers then amended and adopted
these in 2017/2018. Accordingly, the following six legal
acts form the core of the 2030 Framework:
• Directive (EU) 2018/410 amending Directive
2003/87/EC on the EU emissions trading system
(the ETS Directive);
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• Regulation (EU) 2018/842 on binding annual GHG
emission reductions by member states from 2021
to 2030 contributing to climate action to meet
commitments under the Paris Agreement (the
Effort-Sharing Regulation);
• Directive (EU) 2018/2001 on the promotion of the
use of energy from renewable sources (the RE
Directive);
• Directive (EU) 2018/2002 amendingDirective 2012/
27/EU on energy efficiency (the EE Directive);
• Regulation (EU) 2018/841 on the inclusion of GHG
emissions and removals from land use, land use
change and forestry in the 2030 climate and en-
ergy framework (the LULUCF Regulation);
• Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 on the governance of
the Energy Union and climate action (the Gover-
nance Regulation).
This core is complemented by further legislative instru-
ments not addressed in detail here, including Direc-
tive 2018/844 on the Energy Performance of Buildings,
a Regulation on the electricity market (which awaits
final adoption after agreement was reached in tria-
logue negotiations in December 2018) as well as several
other pieces of legislation related to energy policy (see
overview in Ringel & Knodt, 2018). While a more com-
prehensive analysis of the legislation of the 2030 Frame-
work is beyond the scope of this article, the following dis-
cussion focuses on the key features. Some further details
relevant for the analysis of the stringency of governance
are presented in Section 4.
The 2030 Framework upgrades and updates the
three headline targets for 2030. Accordingly, the EU es-
tablishes a binding target of reducing its GHG emissions
by at least 40 per cent from 1990 levels. This target is
implemented through the ETS Directive and the Effort-
Sharing Regulation. The ETS Directive determines a lin-
ear GHG emission reduction path declining by 2.2 per
cent per year from 2021 to deliver a total reduction of
43 per cent below 2005 levels in 2030 in the ETS sectors
(ETS Directive, revised Article 9). The Effort-Sharing Regu-
lation obliges eachmember state to reduce its GHG emis-
sions in the non-ETS sectors linearly towards a specific
emission reduction target in order to deliver an overall
EU emission reduction in these sectors of 30 per cent be-
low 2005 levels in 2030. The EU’s new RE target for 2030
is 32 per cent of final energy consumption and the new
EE target is a 32.5 per cent improvement by 2030. Both
these targets were significantly increased in the legisla-
tive process from the 27 per cent targets the European
Council agreed for each in 2014. The RE Directive defines
a “binding (overall) Union target” (Articles 1 and 3), but
it does not anymore contain binding targets for each in-
dividual member state. The EE target remains indicative
(“headline target”: Article 1 of the EE Directive).
The new LULUCF Regulation integrates the LULUCF
sector, which was previously not covered, into the EU’s
Climate and Energy Policy Framework. It determines that
each member state will have to ensure that LULUCF
emissions do not exceed removals by the sector from
2021-2025 and from 2026-2030 (LULUCF Regulation, Ar-
ticle 4). On the basis of agreed accounting rules, each
member state has to submit a national forestry ac-
counting plan for the five-year periods 2021–2025 (by
2018) and 2026–2030 (in 2023) under Article 8 of the
LULUCF Regulation.
The new Governance Regulation establishes an in-
tegrated framework for planning, reporting, and review
related to the 2030 Framework (including other key el-
ements of the Energy Union such as energy security).
Building on related provisions in the existing RE and EE
Directives, the Governance Regulation, in particular, re-
quires each member state to submit in 2019, and ev-
ery ten years thereafter, an integrated National Energy
and Climate Plan (NECP). This plan is to include national
contributions to the EU-wide RE and EE targets as well
as related existing and planned policies and measures
and is to be updated every five years (Articles 3, 9 and
14). Member states are also required to submit biennial
progress reports on the implementation of their NECPs
(Articles 17, 20–25), report biennially on policies and
measures to implement their GHG emission target (Arti-
cle 18) and annually on GHG emissions (Article 26).Mem-
ber states also have to prepare, submit, and regularly up-
date long-term strategies for climate and energy with a
time horizon of at least 30 years (Article 15).
The Governance Regulation furthermore mandates
the European Commission to monitor progress and take
any remedial action (Articles 9 and 13, Chapter 5), as-
sisted by the EEA (Article 42). In addition to regularly
assessing overall progress by the EU as a whole, the
Commission is to assess individual member states’ plans
and progress in their implementation, including the ex-
ante assessment of draft plans before they are finalised
(Articles 9 and 13, Chapter 5). Where the Commission
finds the overall ambition of plans or overall progress to-
wards the relevant energy and climate targets to be insuf-
ficient, it is empowered/tasked to take targeted action
in response. This includes recommendations to individ-
ual and/or all member states as well as proposing other
measures (e.g., legislation) and exercising “its powers at
Union level” (Articles 31 and 32). Member states whose
progress on expanding RE is lagging are required to im-
plement additionalmeasureswithin one year tomake up
for the gap. Such additional measures may include con-
tributing to an RE financing mechanism set up at Union
level and need to be specified in the biennial progress
reports (on the basis of which the Commission, in turn,
can again issue recommendations) (Articles 32 and 33).
Regarding overall progress, the Commission is to release
a State of the Energy Union report annually (Article 35).
2.2. The Paris Agreement on Climate Change
Concluded in 2015, the Paris Agreement provides a new
global framework for international climate governance
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under theUN Framework Convention on Climate Change.
In contrast to the Kyoto Protocol which, for the EU and
other developed countries, established binding emission
targets, the Paris Agreement adopts a more procedural
approach. While the Agreement has a comprehensive
scope (including adaptation, finance, technology, capac-
ity building and others), I focus on the approach to mit-
igation as the most relevant aspect for the EU’s Climate
and Energy Policy Framework.
In brief, the new approach to international gover-
nance of climate mitigation under the Paris Agreement
can be crystallised in three main components. First, the
Paris Agreement establishes and specifies clear overall
targets and objectives for international climate gover-
nance. Article 2 determines the global temperature goal
of “holding the increase of the global average tempera-
ture towell below2°C above pre-industrial levels and pur-
suing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C
above pre-industrial levels”. To this end, Article 4.1 fur-
ther specifies that global net GHGemissions should reach
zero “in the second half of this century”. Second, the
Paris Agreement establishes primarily procedural obli-
gations to prepare, submit, maintain, and update NDCs
and to report on emissions and the implementation of
NDCs followed by a review of this information. Parties
are obliged to “pursue domesticmitigationmeasures” to-
wards their NDCs (Article 4.2), but they are not strictly
required to achieve what they promised in their NDCs.
Third, the Agreement sets up a regular cycle of review
and revision to ratchet up efforts and increase ambition
over time including a 5-yearly stocktake of past efforts
(starting in 2023) as a basis for subsequent rounds of
strengthening of NDCs (on the Paris Agreement, see Bo-
dansky, 2016a; Doelle, 2016; Keohane & Oppenheimer,
2016; Klein, Carazo, Doelle, Bulmer, & Higham, 2017).
Finally, it is relevant tomention that, especially as a re-
sult of the EU’s Governance Regulation, EU climate and en-
ergy governance and the Paris Agreement have become
aligned in important respects. In particular, the five-year
cycle of the submission/revision of NECPs is in line with
the five-year cycle of review and revision under the Paris
Agreement, as is annual reporting on emissions and bien-
nial reporting on implementation progress. Both systems
are furthermore directed at creating an upward dynamic
(while preventing backtracking). Moreover, the require-
ment to prepare and submit long-term plans/strategies
under the Governance Regulation implements the related
requirement under Article 4.19 of the Paris Agreement. In
addition, the review of RE and EE targets foreseen under
Articles 3 of the respective EU Directives by 2023, fits with
the international reviewof progress under the Paris Agree-
ment to be undertaken in 2023.
3. Assessing the Bindingness and Stringency of
Governance: Four Criteria
Howcanwe assess the bindingness and stringency of par-
ticular regulations and governance frameworks? I sug-
gest in the following a set of four criteria which are
rooted in political science/governance but also informed
by international and European law. Going beyond a nar-
rower conception of formal legal bindingness (e.g., Bo-
dansky, 2016b), the criteria are based on literature on
hard versus soft law as well as the bindingness and le-
galisation of (international) governance (e.g., Abbott &
Snidal, 2000; Kalimo & Staal, 2014; Keohane, Moravc-
sik, & Slaughter, 2000; Oberthür & Bodle, 2016; Shaffer
& Pollack, 2010; Trubek & Trubek, 2005). Being generic,
the criteria enable a differentiated and systematic as-
sessment of the bindingness/stringency of both interna-
tional and European governance frameworks. They are
based on an understanding of softness and hardness
(stringency) that is gradual rather than binary and aims
at assessing governance rather than law as such.
3.1. Formal Status
The formal status of the rules on which a governance
framework rests constitutes a first basic criterion for its
bindingness (see the standard of “obligation” by Abbott
& Snidal, 2000). At stake is therefore whether gover-
nance is rooted in legal acts that are formally capable of
establishing binding rules, rights/entitlements, and obli-
gations. For example, in EU governance, the European
Treaties, as well as Regulations, Directives and Decisions,
are formally binding (see Article 288 of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union, TFEU). If require-
ments are not based on such binding instruments, ac-
tors will not strictly be legally obliged to adapt their be-
haviour accordingly. While formally non-binding instru-
mentsmay still carry significant political weight and push
actors to behavioural change, they also face significant
limitations regarding accountability and legal implemen-
tation/enforcement (see below).
3.2. Nature of Obligations
Second, the substance of the “what” of the obligations
is significant for the stringency of a governance frame-
work. Particularly relevant in this respect is whether and
to what extent any obligations directly address the sub-
stantive behaviour at stake or only indirectly relate to
such behaviour without strictly requiring it to change.
Some of the legal literature has introduced a distinction
between “obligations of result” (e.g., an obligation to
achieve a certain emission reduction) and “obligations
of conduct” (e.g., an obligation to report on emissions).
This distinction seems problematic, however, since some
obligations of conduct can be rather substantive (e.g. an
obligation to introduce a certain policy instrument such
as a carbon tax). It may hence be more useful in our
context to distinguish between “substantive” obligations
that imply significant behavioural adaptations related to
the problem at stake, such as reducing emissions or in-
troducing/increasing a carbon tax, and purely “procedu-
ral” obligations which may at best only indirectly encour-
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age behavioural change, such as requirements to mea-
sure emissions, submit a report or prepare a plan (see
discussion in Mayer, 2018; Oberthür & Bodle, 2016).
3.3. Prescriptiveness and Precision
Third, how prescriptively and precisely rules establishing
rights/entitlements and obligations are worded affects
the actual bindingness of governance. The precision of
a provision depends on how well defined the addressee
(who), the substance (what), and the timeline (by when)
are. Prescriptiveness depends on the discretion left to
the subject of an obligation. In contrast to a clear-cut
“shall” provision, the use of the word “should” leaves
some discretion. Other ways to blur what the addressee
is expected to do include the use of “may” or “could” or
of expressions such as “to take into account”, “encour-
age”, “strive to”, or the qualifications “as appropriate”
and “as far as possible” (Abbott & Snidal, 2000; Oberthür
& Bodle, 2016). The precision and prescriptiveness of the
relevant rules determine the clarity of what the subjects
of these rules are expected, entitled, and required to do.
3.4. Accountability and Effective Implementation
(Including Enforcement)
Last, but not least, it is important to consider the means
available to promote and ensure accountability and ef-
fective implementation (including enforcement). In this
respect, transparency (through monitoring and report-
ing) is a fundamental requirement. Without a minimum
level of transparency of relevant actions and behaviour,
even otherwise binding obligations may not “bite” in re-
ality. In addition, mandating a dedicated body to over-
see implementation and address implementation issues
has been found to be of utmost importance in support-
ing effective implementation (Keohane et al., 2000). In
this respect, the availability of effective measures to ad-
dress deficiencies in implementation, including effective
incentives and/or means of enforcement, seems partic-
ularly important (Bang, Hovi, & Skodvin, 2016). Being
able to hold the subjects of a rule to account for their
implementation and compliance gives teeth to this rule
and provides an important motivation for adapting be-
haviour accordingly.
3.5. Four Meaningful Criteria Capturing Key Aspects of
the Stringency of Governance
There is, in principle, no correlation between the four
dimensions and they can have varying scores along a
gradual scale. Both formally binding and non-binding
instruments can contain substantive and/or procedural
requirements of varying precision and prescriptiveness
with varying accountability and means for ensuring ef-
fective implementation attached. While the overarch-
ing framework in which rules and regulations are em-
bedded affect these dimensions (see, for example, Sec-
tion 4.4 below on the special enforcement powers un-
der supranational EU law), the stringency of governance
is hence not understood as binary (soft—hard, binding—
non-binding) but as gradual (see also Kalimo & Staal,
2014). It is also difficult to establish trade-offs between
the four dimensions. As a result, it is not easy to de-
termine where soft governance ends and hard gover-
nance starts.
Taken together, these four criteria provide for a quite
comprehensive, systematic, and differentiated conceptu-
alisation of the bindingness/stringency of governance, in-
cluding for comparative purposes. All four criteria are di-
rectly behaviourally relevant since they capture which
behaviour is targeted and how strong the impetus is
to adapt this behaviour accordingly. They depict key as-
pects that actors may employ to escape changing their
behaviour: they could claim that the actual legal instru-
ment as such (formal status) or a specific rule (prescrip-
tiveness and precision) are not binding; they could also
adapt procedures as required without changing the rel-
evant substantive behaviour (nature of obligation), or
they could neglect inconvenient obligations (accountabil-
ity and effective implementation). Among the four cri-
teria, the nature of obligations adds a new content el-
ement to previous accounts of softness and hardness
(e.g., Keohane et al., 2000; see also Kalimo& Staal, 2014).
Overall, we may arguably expect that a higher score
across the four dimensions may entail a higher degree
of certainty of substantive behavioural effects.
4. How Hard or Soft is the EU’s 2030 Framework?
This section applies the assessment framework devel-
oped above to the analysis of the EU’s 2030 Frame-
work as compared with the preceding 2020 Framework
and themitigation-related provisions of the international
Paris Agreement. The comparison with the 2020 Frame-
work enables us to identify whether EU climate and en-
ergy governance has become more or less stringent. In-
ternational climate governance under the Paris Agree-
ment can, due to the far-reaching differences between
international and EU governance in general, and the ap-
proach of the Paris Agreement in particular (e.g., Bodan-
sky, 2016a; Doelle, 2016; Klein et al., 2017; Oberthür &
Bodle, 2016), be expected to be comparatively soft. As
such, it provides a useful contrast that helps put the strin-
gency of EU climate and energy governance, and related
changes, in perspective, and serves to illustrate the far-
reaching differences between international and suprana-
tional EU governance.
4.1. Formal Status
The 2030 Framework is firmly based on instruments of
binding EU law. The legal acts that form the core of the
2030 Framework (see above) are Directives and Regula-
tions that were proposed by the European Commission
and subsequently adopted under the EU’s “ordinary leg-
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islative procedure” by the European Parliament and the
Council in 2018 in accordance with Articles 192 (environ-
ment) and/or 194 (energy) of the TFEU.
This aspect of the 2030 Framework is unchanged
from the preceding 2020 Framework. The 2020 Frame-
work was based on earlier versions of the ETS, RE and
EE Directives as well as the 2009 Effort-Sharing Deci-
sion (Decision No 406/2009/EC), the predecessor of the
Effort-Sharing Regulation (on the 2020 Framework, see
Delbeke & Vis, 2015; Jordan et al., 2010; Oberthür &
Pallemaerts, 2010). The new legal base of the RE and EE
Directives—TFEU Article 194 on energy that was intro-
duced in the 2009 Lisbon Treaty—does not change their
formal legal status.
The formal status of the legal instruments of the
2030 Framework is also comparable to that of the Paris
Agreement. In accordance with Article 2 of the 1969
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, international
treaties constitute instruments of international law that
their parties are legally required to implement, much
like EU member states (and others) are required to im-
plement Regulations, Directives and Decisions. The 2015
Paris Agreement on climate change is an international
treaty in this sense (on the legal nature of the Paris Agree-
ment, see Bodansky, 2016b; Oberthür & Bodle, 2016).
That its formal legal status is thus comparable to the 2030
Framework is not meant to negate the crucial qualita-
tive differences that exist between international and EU
law (not least, direct effect, including on individuals, and
qualitatively different means of enforcement) as also re-
flected in other criteria of bindingness addressed below
(see especially Section 4.4 on accountability and effec-
tive implementation).
4.2. Nature of Obligations
The 2030 Framework combines substantive and proce-
dural obligations in specific ways. As presented in Sec-
tion 2 above, key substantive obligations are especially
included in the ETS Directive and the Effort-Sharing and
LULUCF Regulations. In addition, the RE and EE Direc-
tives, in particular, establish a number of further substan-
tive requirements. These include obligations onmember
states to ensure 2020 RE targets are not undercut (Article
3.4) and that RE in transport reach 14 per cent by 2030
(Article 25) as well as relating to support schemes for
renewables (Articles 4–6), renewable self-consumption
and RE communities (Articles 21 and 22), RE in heating
and cooling (Article 23), sustainability criteria for biofu-
els, bioliquids, and biomass (Article 26) as well as the ver-
ification of compliancewith them (Article 30, all RE Direc-
tive) and annual energy savings of 1.5 per cent by 2030,
with various flexibilities (EE Directive, revised Article 7),
among others. Key procedural components, as especially
contained in the Governance Regulation, relate to NECPs,
national forestry accounting plans, biennial and annual
reports, and long-term strategies. Importantly, member
states are required to specify their national contributions
to the EU’s RE and EE targets in their NECPs and, where
the Commission finds progress on RE to be lacking, to
take additional measures within one year.
It is not clear whether the nature of the 2030 Frame-
work’s obligations is more or less stringent than the
2020 Framework. On one hand, binding national targets
for the expansion of RE for individual member states
have been discontinued. On the other hand, the accom-
panying procedural obligations have been significantly
strengthened. Planning elements that were previously
separate (RE, EE, climate action) have been further im-
proved and integrated into the NECPs, which enhances
visibility; and a firm requirement for member states to
prepare, submit, and regularly update long-term strate-
gies has been introduced. Furthermore, as further dis-
cussed in the next section, an agreed formula allows na-
tional RE contributions to be determined for each mem-
ber state in case the actions taken by member states do
not add up to the EU’s overall target of 32 per cent by
2030. Any member state that falls short in its progress is
required to implement additional measures. Overall, the
abandonment of national binding RE targets is hence sig-
nificantly balanced by the introduction and strengthen-
ing of other elements.
Both the substantive and the procedural obligations
under the 2030 Framework are significantly more strin-
gent than those under the Paris Agreement. To start
with, the significant substantive obligations of EU mem-
ber states under the 2030 Framework (including quanti-
tative targets) contrast with the Paris Agreement’s nearly
exclusive focus on procedural obligations, even if tuned
towards agreed global goals (see Section 2.2 above). In
addition, the Paris Agreement has fewer procedural obli-
gations in comparison (related to NDCs and reporting
and review; see Bodansky, 2016a, 2016b; Keohane &
Oppenheimer, 2016; Oberthür & Bodle, 2016). Aswewill
see in the next section, they also are much vaguer when
compared to the 2030 Framework.
4.3. Prescriptiveness and Precision
The key substantive and procedural obligations of the
2030 Framework generally score highly on prescriptive-
ness and precision. The aforementioned obligations and
quantitative targets under the ETS Directive, the Effort-
Sharing Regulation and the LULUCF Regulation are well
defined. Specific dates for the submission of draft, up-
dated, and final NECPs, national forestry accounting
plans, long-term strategies, biennial reports, and an-
nual reports are determined. Guidance on the informa-
tion these plans and reports have to contain and the
methodologieswhich have to be applied,where relevant,
is detailed.
Several flexibilities granted in the 2030 Framework
limit its prescriptivenesswithout undercutting it. The ETS
Directive allows free allocation of emission allowances
to industries in international competition and to power
plants in certain (central and eastern European) mem-
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ber states. The Effort-Sharing Regulation permits (lim-
ited) banking and borrowing, transfer of emissions reduc-
tions between member states, and off-setting with ETS
allowances as well as with GHG removals in the LULUCF
sector up to a defined maximum (Articles 5–7 and An-
nexes II and III). The LULUCF Regulation also provides
some flexibility, including the possibility of banking net
emission removals for subsequent years and transferring
them between member states (Articles 11–13). The RE
Directive furthermore allows member states to engage
in statistical transfers and joint projects with each other
and with third countries in order to achieve their na-
tional contributions (Articles 8–12). Other substantive re-
quirements of the RE and EE Directives also introduce
flexibilities. Overall, these flexibilities soften the prescrip-
tiveness of the well-defined obligations in a limited and
clearly defined way.
Similarly, a number of ambiguities soften some obli-
gations to some extentwithout abandoning them. Promi-
nently, the RE and EE Directives do not contain national
RE and EE targets for member states but only define
Union-wide targets for 2030 (Article 3 RE Directive; Ar-
ticle 1 EE Directive). Similarly, the Governance Regula-
tion allows member state contributions to the EU tar-
gets for RE and EE to be based on loosely defined “na-
tional/relevant circumstances” (including, in the case of
RE, “early efforts”) to be explicated in NECPs (Articles 5
and 6). The other aforementioned substantive require-
ments of the RE and EE Directives on support schemes
for RE etc. also introduce ambiguities at times, including
with respect to the annual energy savings target of 1.5
per cent and the increase of RE in heating and cooling.
Overall, however, the ambiguities remain limited in num-
ber and scope.
The 2030 Framework has both strengthened and
weakened the prescriptiveness and precision of the pre-
ceding 2020 Framework.Many of the flexibilities and am-
biguities included in the 2030 Framework already exist
in the 2020 Framework. However, the abandonment of
binding national RE targets and the extension of flexibili-
ties member states enjoy under the Effort-Sharing Reg-
ulation (regarding LULUCF and ETS allowances) in par-
ticular, even though well defined, have weakened pre-
cision and prescriptiveness. In contrast, requirements re-
lating to plans, progress reports, and the long-term strat-
egy have become much more precise with the Gover-
nance Regulation (compare the relevant provisions in
the Governance Regulation with the pre-existing require-
ments in the 2009 RE Directive 2009/28/EC, especially
Article 22, and the 2012 EE Directive 2012/27/EU, espe-
cially Article 24 and Annex XIV; see also Article 15 and
Annex IV of the Governance Regulation). Importantly,
the Regulation contains a detailed formula for calculat-
ing each member state’s fair share of the EU RE target of
32 per cent for 2030 (Article 5 and Annex II). The Commis-
sion is required to use this formula as a reference where
the aggregate contributions of the member states fall
short of the EU target (Article 31.2).While not containing
national RE targets, the Governance Regulation hence al-
lows such targets to be derived for each member state.
These only come into play formally if individual contri-
butions are insufficient, but they may well provide guid-
ance to member states in designing their contributions
and serve as a more general point of reference. On bal-
ance, the 2030 Framework has hence hardly weakened
the prescriptiveness and precision of EU climate and en-
ergy governance.
In comparison, the Paris Agreement is much less pre-
scriptive and precise overall. Its largely procedural obli-
gations are fewer and more discretionary than those
of the Governance Regulation, e.g. by leaving the struc-
ture and content of NDCs largely up to each party
(Keohane & Oppenheimer, 2016; Oberthür & Bodle,
2016; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change [UNFCCC], 2018). This contrasts with the much
higher number of precise obligations for each member
state under the EU’s 2030 Framework relating to the ETS,
the non-ETS sectors, the LULUCF sector, the preparation
and submission of NECPs and long-term strategies, and
various aspects of RE and EE (see above).
4.4. Accountability and Effective Implementation
(Including Enforcement)
Both the general EU governance framework and the
2030 Framework itself, in particular, the Governance
Regulation, provide significant means supporting ac-
countability and effective implementation. Hence, fail-
ure to implement legal obligations arising from the 2030
Framework (see above) can in principle be subject to
infringement proceedings in accordance with Articles
258–260 of the TFEU (involving the Commission and the
Court of Justice of the EU with the possibility of penalty
payments). To the extent that it has “direct effect”, EU
law can furthermore to a significant extent be enforced
through the national courts of the member states (Craig
& de Búrca, 2015, especially Chapters 7 and 8). It is here
that the embedding of EU climate and energy gover-
nance in the overarching supranational order of the EU
matters most. In addition, the Governance Regulation
not only enhances transparency through planning and
reporting by member states but also mandates the Euro-
pean Commission to monitor implementation and take
remedial action, as elaborated in Section 2.1 above.
As such, the 2030 Framework maintains a high level
of support for effective implementation and enforce-
ment (compared to the 2020 Framework). On one hand,
infringement proceedings under Articles 258–260 can
no longer be employed to enforce national RE targets,
as these targets have been abandoned. On the other
hand, the Governance Regulation introduces an obliga-
tion for member states to take corrective action where
their efforts towards the EU-wide RE target of 32 per
cent for 2030 fall short. Even though form and content
of such corrective action are left to each member state,
failure to take effective action can in principle lead to in-
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fringement proceedings. In addition, the integration of
planning and reporting across the different dimensions
of the “Energy Union” enhances transparency and ac-
countability, and the monitoring and enforcement pow-
ers of the Commission have been strengthened (ex-ante
assessment of plans, Commission recommendations).
Member states are now required to take “due account”
of Commission recommendations (Article 34.2), to re-
port on their follow-up and provide justification in case
they do not act upon these recommendations. On bal-
ance, accountability and effective implementation can
hardly be said to have suffered from the 2020 to the
2030 Framework.
These arrangements for promoting accountability
and effective implementation are significantly more
stringent than those under the Paris Agreement. The
differences are particularly pronounced with respect to
available response measures and, to a lesser extent,
monitoring of implementation. The Paris Agreement in
its Article 13 and its further implementing provisions
(UNFCCC, 2018) requires parties to report on GHG in-
ventories and the implementation of NDCs in a similar
way as, but in less detail than, the Governance Regula-
tion does for EU member states. It also foresees tech-
nical reviews of such reports by teams of technical ex-
perts. However, there is no review of the ambition of
NDCs and the review of implementation is limited be-
cause achieving/implementing NDCs is not a legal re-
quirement. Recommendations on NDCs and their imple-
mentation are not provided for and the mechanism for
facilitating implementation and ensuring compliance un-
der Article 15 of the Agreement will focus on particu-
lar problems rather than assessing implementation of
each and every party (as the Commission is mandated to
do under the Governance Regulation). Furthermore, the
mechanismwill only have soft, facilitativemeasures avail-
able (see Bang et al., 2016; Klein et al., 2017; Oberthür &
Northrop, 2018; UNFCCC, 2018).
5. Discussion and Conclusions
The EU’s 2030 Framework scores relatively highly on the
four dimensions of governance stringency and binding-
ness distinguished here (see Table 1). It is based on bind-
ing EU legal acts, namely various Regulations and Direc-
tives, and establishes both significant substantive and
procedural obligations/requirements. While the Frame-
work does leave considerable degrees of discretion to
member states, this is not unusual for EU legislation (and
indeed immanent in the instrument of EUDirectives) and
this discretion is confined in important ways. Further-
more, the governance framework and its embedding in
broader supranational EU governance structures provide
for high levels of accountability and effective implemen-
tation. Various obligations under the Framework are gen-
erally suitable for the European Commission to initiate
infringement proceedings in case of there being a lack of
implementation. In addition, the Governance Regulation
mandates the European Commission to follow up with
eachmember state on its planning and reporting andpro-
vides specific means for the Commission to advance im-
plementation (including recommendations).
The 2030 Framework differs slightly from its prede-
cessor, the 2020 Framework, but these changes, on bal-
ance, do not make EU climate and energy governance
less stringent or less binding (see also Table 1). On the
downside, binding national RE targets became lost in the
2030 Framework and some new flexibilities give addi-
tional, though limited room for member states to cush-
ion the required behavioural changes. On a more pos-
itive side, however, member states’ procedural obliga-
tions to prepare energy and climate plans and long-term
strategies as well as to report on progress in implemen-
tation have been strengthened, as have the aforemen-
tioned powers of the European Commission to monitor
and promote implementation. Furthermore, the Gover-
nance Regulation contains a formula that, in the absence
Table 1. Stringency of climate/energy governance frameworks.
Dimension EU 2030 EU 2020 Paris Agreement
Formal status high high high
(binding EU legal acts) (binding EU legal acts) (international treaty)
Nature of medium-high medium-high low
obligation (substantive & enhanced (substantive & procedural (procedural requirements)
procedural requirement, incl. requirement, incl. binding
binding emission targets) targets for emissions and RE)
Prescriptiveness medium-high medium-high low-medium
and precision (precise obligations with (precise obligations with (high degree of discretion)
limited ambiguities/ limited ambiguities/
flexibilities) flexibilities)
Accountability high high medium
and (reporting, enhanced follow-up (reporting, limited follow-up (reporting, expert review,
implementation by COM, infringements) by the COM, infringements) facilitative response measures)
Source: own assessment based on Section 4 (see there for further detail).
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of national RE targets, allows national RE shares to be de-
termined for eachmember state, in the event that aggre-
gate ambitions of member states are insufficient for the
collective target of 32 per cent by 2030. Overall, a lim-
ited loss of substantive obligations is balanced by gains
in procedural obligations and powers to promote effec-
tive implementation.
Differences between this assessment of EU climate
and energy governance and others may in part result
from the specific set of criteria systematically applied
here. In contrast to the above assessment, others have
likened current EU energy governance to the OMC, ar-
guing that it is soft and that the 2030 Framework, es-
pecially its Governance Regulation, amount to “’harder’
soft governance” (Ringel & Knodt, 2018, p. 215, see also
p. 219). Part of the difference may arise because the as-
sessment put forward here goes beyond energy gover-
nance in the strict sense, taking an integrated view of
EU energy and climate governance. Such an integrated
view is immanent in the 2030 Framework and the EU’s En-
ergy Union project and enshrined in the overarching Gov-
ernance Regulation which has a double legal base and
covers both aspects. Perhaps more importantly, the four-
dimensional conceptualisation of the stringency of gov-
ernance along the soft-hard continuum advocated here
goes beyond an analysis focusing—implicitly—on proce-
dural aspects. In this context, the contrast with the in-
ternational Paris Agreement illustrates the relative strin-
gency of the EU governance framework. Overall, the sys-
tematic and differentiated approach to assessing gover-
nance stringency pursued here, based on explicit criteria
that capture key aspects of bindingness, enables an en-
compassing and fine-grained appraisal and can hopefully
facilitate future debate on how to measure and evaluate
the stringency of governance.
The prospect for delivery of the EU’s 2030 targets
for climate and energy hence remains strong. The 2020
Framework has, even without significant recourse to in-
fringement proceedings, led to significant adaptations of
member state policies and industry behaviour. As a re-
sult, the EU remains on track to overachieving its binding
GHG emission reduction target for 2020 and has its bind-
ing RE target within reach (while successful achievement
of its indicative EE target remains uncertain) (EEA, 2018).
Admittedly, more factors than simply the stringency of
the governance framework affect whether or not the EU
will succeed in achieving its strengthened 2030 targets.
However, the 2030 Framework builds on the proven
2020 Framework and introduces further means to pro-
mote delivery, especially by further strengthening the
role of the European Commission, as mentioned above.
Whether this will be sufficient to ensure actual delivery
will not least depend on how the Commission uses the
powers and tools it has received (in addition to those it
continues to have at its disposal under the EU Treaties).
It may not be surprising that EU climate and energy
governance under the 2030 Framework, therefore, re-
mains much “harder” than international climate gover-
nance under the Paris Agreement (see Table 1). While
the formal status of the relevant legal instruments is
similar, the nature of the obligations, their prescriptive-
ness and precision, and the means available for promot-
ing accountability and effective implementation differ
widely. The Paris Agreement primarily establishes proce-
dural obligations to prepare and submit national climate
plans in the form of NDCs and to report on emissions
and NDC implementation subject to expert review. In
contrast, the 2030 Framework establishes both various
substantive and procedural obligations, with the latter
going far beyond the Paris Agreement. The 2030 Frame-
work’s requirements are also much more prescriptive
and precise than the Paris Agreement and are backed
up by far stronger mechanisms for promoting account-
ability and effective implementation led by the Euro-
pean Commission.
This raises the question of why the EU, although up-
dating its climate and energy governance towards 2030
to implement the Paris Agreement, did not weaken it in
light of this Agreement. Whereas the EU was obliged to
achieve its GHGemission target under the Kyoto Protocol,
the Paris Agreement lacks a similar substantive interna-
tional obligation (see Section 2).While this article has not
investigated the factors that may help us explain the con-
tinued stringency of EU climate and energy governance,
we may consider that there are strong forces within the
EU that support such continued stringency. They include
significant interests in the continued promotion of RE and
EE, the status of climate and energy governance as a do-
mestic and international signature issue for the EU, the
supranational system of EU governance built on “the rule
of law” as a whole, and general path dependency favour-
ing continuity and incremental change. As long as these
forces remain in place, they may also drive the develop-
ment of EU climate and energy policy beyond 2030. One
important implication is that—since the implementation
of the Paris Agreement so far relies nearly exclusively on
domestic delivery systems and hence remains highly vul-
nerable to related shortcomings—the EU continues to
have a strong interest in strengthening international cli-
mate governance as well.
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